A Proofs
This section provides the omitted proofs in the text.
Theorem 1. The CSG problem on MR-TTGs is N P-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the bounded multidimensional knapsack problem, which is formally defined as:
q k=1 w jk · x k ≤ c j j = 1, . . . , m.
(2)
The proof proceeds as follows: (1) The BMKP is mapped to an instance of an MR-TTG; (2) a solution for the BMKP is constructed from the optimal solution to the CSG on MR-TTG; (3) we show that the optimality of the solution to the CSG guarantees the optimality of the BMKP from step (2).
First, given an instance of a BMKP, an MR-TTG of 2 players is constructed as follows: the knapsack dimensions are mapped directly to the resource types R = {1, . . . , m} and item types are mapped to task types T = {1, . . . , q}. Consequently, the number of copies of every item type b k is mapped to the task demand d k , ∀k ∈ q. Moreover, each task type k ∈ T is described by a value v k = p k and a vector of thresholds τ k = w k . The knapsack capacity can be divided between the players to represent the resources they posses. We divide the capacity such as player 1 gets the first m 2 resources and player 2 gets the rest. Thus, the resource vectors for the first and second players are r 1 = (c 1 , . . . , c m 2 , 0, . . . , 0) and r 2 = (0, . . . , 0, c m 2 +1 , . . . , c m ) consecutively. Secondly, let CS * be an optimal coalition structure for the constructed MR-TTG. A solution, x, to the BMKP can be derived from CS * as: the number of items to be packed in the knapsack is equal to the size of the optimal coalition structure |CS * |, more specifically, there are |CS * k | copies of each item type k, i.e., x k = |CS * k |. This solution respects the BMKP constraints eq (??) since |CS * k |, the number of accomplished tasks of type k, is bounded by
Finally, we prove by contradiction that x is optimal. Let us assume that the derived solution, x, is not optimal. This assumption implies the existence of another solution, x , to the BMKP with a greater payoff than x, i.e.,
Since c = r 1 + r 2 and w k = τ k we can write the last inequality as q k=1 τ k · x k ≤ r 1 + r 2 . This means that there exist a coalition structure CS such that players 1 and 2 can jointly accomplish x k tasks of type k, i.e., |CS k | = x k , k = 1, . . . , q. The value of this coalition structure can be calculated as
Theorem 2. The Coalition Structure Generation problem for a MR-TTG can be reduced in a polynomial time to a BMKP.
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows: (1) The CSG problem is mapped to an instance of the BMKP; (2) a coalition structure is constructed from the optimal solution to the BMKP; (3) we show that the optimality of the solution to the BMKP guarantees the optimality of the coalition structure from step (2).
First, a BMKP is constructed from a CSG problem for an MR-TTG. Given the input to the CSG problem, each task type k can be mapped to an item type k in the corresponding BMKP. Item type k is described by a profit p k = v k and the weights vector w k = τ k . In addition, the demand d k corresponds to the bound b k (number of copies available of each item). Finally, the capacity of the knapsack is calculated as c j = n i=1 r i j , ∀ j = 1, . . . , m. Secondly, we give a polynomial time algorithm of complexity O( q k=1 b k · m · n) to translate an outcome of a BMKP to a coalition structure for an MR-TTG (see algorithm ??). The outcome has x k copies of item k and a profit of q k=1 p k · x k . The input of the algorithm is the set of agents A, agents' possessions r i , the set of task types T , and the outcome of the BMKP. The algorithm distributes agents' resources among partial coalitions so that each partial coalition is satisfied; it assigns a value to the variable w i jkl (line 7). From the loops in lines 3 and 4 we can see that the number of partial coalitions formed is q k=1 x k , and specifically the number of partial coalitions formed of type k is x k . Therefore, |CS k | = x k ≤ b k = d k , from the definition of the BMKP. In addition, the condition in line 9 ensures that an agent i does not contribute more than a total of r i j , ∀ j ∈ R in all the partial coalitions i has joined. Hence, the outcome of a BMKP satisfies the properties of a coalition structure after algorithm ?? has run.
Finally, we prove by contradiction that the generated coalition structure CS is optimal. Let us assume that CS is not optimal, this assumption leads to the existence of another coalition structure CS with a value greater than the value of CS; ∃ CS s.t. C kl ∈CS v(C kl ) > C kl ∈CS v(C kl ). Suppose that the number of partial coalitions working on a task of type k in CS is x k (|CS k | = x k ) and for CS we know from algorithm ?? that |CS k | = x k then the previous inequality can be written as q k=1 v k · x k > q k=1 v k · x k . Also, from the feasibility of CS , the resource constraint C kl ∈CS w i jkl ≤ r i j can be generalised
Since it is optimal to allocate exactly τ k to each partial coalition C kl due to monotonicity ( n i=1 w i jkl = τ jk , ∀ j ∈ R), the resource constraint can be re-written as
there is a feasible solution to the BMKP with x k copies of item k, resource requirement w jk ·x k ≤ c j , ∀ j = 1, . . . , m and value q k=1 p k ·x k > q k=1 p k ·x k -contradiction since it outvalues the optimal solution.
Algorithm 1: Redistribute agents' resources 1: w i jkl = 0, ∀ i ∈ A, j ∈ R, k ∈ T, l ≤ x k 2: i = 1 3: for all tasks types k ∈ T do 4:
for all copies l ≤ x k of k do 5:
for all j ∈ R do 6:
repeat 7:
if r i j = 0 then 10: i = (i + 1) mod n 11:
until n i=1 w i jkl = τ jk Theorem 3. A bounded multi-dimensional knapsack problem can be reduced to a multiple-choice multi-dimensional knapsack problem.
Proof. The MMKP is formally defined as:
h y g=1 x y g = 1 g = 1, . . . , h y (5)
Let C be a multiset such that k ∈ C, ∀ k = 1, . . . , q and the recurrence of item k ∈ C (multiplicity of k) is denoted by
Suppose that C is partitioned into an arbitrary number υ of multisets C y , y = 1, . . . , υ and let Y = ∪ υ y=1 {P (C y )}, where P (C y ) denotes the power set of C y . For an arbitrary multiset S ∈ P (C y ), assuming all the items it holds k ∈ S are required to be packed at a time, the profit and vector of weights for S are p S = k∈S p k and w S = k∈S w k respectively.
The set Y represents a multiple-choice multidimensional knapsack problem with υ classes. Furthermore, the power set P (C y ) constitutes the classes y = 1, . . . , υ. The objective function, as shown below, restricts the number of sets of
